Hospital payment regulation has historically been introduced to meet multiple policy objectives. The primary objective of "all-payer" rate setting regimes was to control costs through consistent, centrally regulated payments. These regimes were often linked, however, to an ancillary goal of financing care for the uninsured. We show that this secondary objective made states' all-payer regimes economically and legally unstable. Their economic instability reflected a feedback loop from surcharge rates to insurance coverage rates and back to the quantities of uncompensated care in need of being financed. The erosion of all-payer regimes' surcharge bases was particularly pronounced when health maintenance organizations were exempted from surcharge collections, creating a regulatory arbitrage opportunity. The economic and legal instability we highlight could largely have been avoided by financing the cost of uncompensated care provision through taxation of income or other standard revenue bases. These developments thus illustrate the wisdom of the Tinbergen Rule, which recommends that independent policy objectives be met with independent policy instruments.
Health care payment regulation has a long history. In the early 1980s, Sloan (1983) observed that payment regulation was "rapidly gaining popularity at both state and federal levels." By the mid-1990s, however, the "all-payer" regimes to which Sloan referred had been abandoned in all states but two (McDonough, 1997b) . To gain insight into these developments, we revisit the structure and objectives of these regimes, which have subsequently resurfaced in health policy commentary (Atkinson, 2009; Murray and Berenson, 2015) . 1
All-payer rate setting systems -in which regulators determine the payments hospitals receive from insurers of all types -are a direct form of price regulation. Introduced during the 1970s and 1980s, they were motivated primarily to control health care costs (McDonough, 1997b) . Beyond cost control, recent discussions of rate regulation emphasize issues of price transparency and consistency. 2
In addition to these relatively direct objectives, all-payer rate setting was used as an instrument for financing the costs of hospital care for the uninsured (Thorpe, 1987; Volpp and Siegel, 1993; Murray and Berenson, 2015) . That is, surcharges for financing "uncompensated care pools" were incorporated into the rates set by allpayer regulatory boards. By implicitly taxing the care insurers purchase for their beneficiaries, these surcharges increase the costs of private insurance. We show that the strain such surcharges place on private insurance markets depends crucially on other features of both rate regulation and uncompensated care financing. Our analysis reveals that both the legality and economic stability of all-payer regulations were undermined by their use as uncompensated care financing mechanisms.
On one level, the financing of uncompensated care is straightforward. Money 1 For example, Vermont has recently been granted initial approval to implement an all-payer rate setting system which would include Medicare's participation.
2 This reflects concerns about prices faced by the uninsured, which can be unknown to the consumer (and the supplying physician, for that matter) when care provision decisions are made (Batty and Ippolito, 2017; Brill, 2013) . Others note that mandated price consistency erodes incentives for providing services with high quality on dimensions that are difficult to measure or otherwise difficult to reimburse (Pauly and Town, 2012) . spent on care for the uninsured must come from somewhere. At the same time, the financing of uncompensated care involves many variables, including the behavior of hospitals, policy makers, and potential insurance purchasers.
The cost in need of financing depends on several factors. A first is the size of the population without insurance (Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo, 2015) . A second involves the incentives hospitals face when treating these individuals (Thorpe and Spencer, 1991; Thorpe and Phelps, 1991) . A third involves regulators' capacity to weed out both cost-ineffective care and fraud (Gaskin, 1997) .
Financing for uncompensated care comes from several sources. At the federal level, sources have historically included subsidies through the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program (Baicker and Staiger, 2005) and Medicare waiver arrangements. At the state and local levels, care for the uninsured is financed through public hospitals and additional assorted hospital subsidy schemes (Duggan, 2000) . Further, non-profit hospitals' tax exemptions are, at least in principle, linked to their uncompensated care obligations (Dattel, 2006) .
The final source of uncompensated care financing is cross-subsidization from private insurers. The uncompensated care pools linked to states' all-payer rate regulation regimes operated through this channel. While the details varied considerably across states and over time, 3 the basic structure was that surcharges sufficient to cover projected uncompensated care costs were added to each year's payment rates.
Uncompensated care surcharges thus depended on three distinct factors. First, they depended on the generosity of other sources of uncompensated care financing.
Second, they depended on the behavior of hospitals and on the regulators charged with assessing what qualifies as uncompensated care (and reimbursement for that care). Third, they depended on the base on which the surcharges were collected.
We show theoretically that uncompensated care surcharges exposed all-payer regimes to risks of unraveling along two dimensions. First, the magnitude of surcharges affects the attractiveness of private insurance to potential beneficiaries. If an increase in surcharge rates leads beneficiaries to drop coverage, the increase in the ranks of the uninsured forces the surcharge to rise further still. The extent of this unraveling depends crucially on the shape of the demand curve. As in the case of adverse selection spirals, a "death spiral" may or may not occur (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Buchmueller and DiNardo, 2002; Clemens, 2015) . Second, where HMOs are exempted from uncompensated care surcharges, unraveling through increases in HMOs' market shares poses an additional challenge.
After developing these theoretical considerations, we provide empirical evidence on the contributions of several channels to the abandonment of the all-payer regimes in Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York. HMO exemptions proved particularly consequential in the case of Massachusetts and, to a lesser extent, New York. Management of uncompensated care costs proved particularly consequential in New Jersey and Connecticut. Across all states, downward trending private coverage rates meant that the burden of financing uncompensated fell on an increasingly narrow, and arguably arbitrary, base. In this environment, the regimes in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York were beset by legal challenges and, like the regime in Massachusetts, ultimately abandoned.
Maryland can be viewed as the exception that proves the rule regarding the stability of all-payer regimes with uncompensated care financing mechanisms. Its system has remained largely intact since its inception in 1971. Notably, it has retained access to a waiver from the Medicare program. That waiver was recently estimated to generate payment subsidies amounting to $1.5 billion per year beyond what Maryland's hospitals would receive in the waiver's absence (Murray and Berenson, 2015) . The lone rate-setting system to persist thus benefits from substantial subsidy.
Our analysis sheds light on several issues of broader interest. We illustrate the risks associated with stretching a policy instrument to target multiple, independent objectives. The case we analyze is extreme in that the ancillary objective of financing uncompensated care proved not just to be ill targeted, but a primary cause of the regulatory regime's undoing. The developments we analyze thus provide a case study in support of the Tinbergen Rule, which holds that independent policy objectives are best met with independently dedicated policy instruments (Tinbergen, 1952) .
We also highlight incidence considerations that arise when regulation engineers redistribution through cross-subsidization -a prominent feature in health care and health insurance contexts. Community rating regulations, for example, are similarly used as a form of social insurance (Clemens, 2015; Handel, Hendel, and Whinston, 2015) . Both community rating regulations and the uncompensated care surcharges we study run risks of market unraveling that can be alleviated by financing transfers through explicit taxation rather than engineering them through regulation. Further, while the financing of tax-and-transfer arrangements can be targeted as desired across the income distribution, the burden of regulatory redistribution falls on those engaged in the affected markets.
Our work sheds light on two additional issues raised regularly in the health economics literature. The first is the cost-shifting hypothesis that health care providers respond to public payment reductions by increasing the rates charged to private insurers. We note, as New Jersey illustrates most sharply, that all-payer regimes could make cost shifting a mechanical phenomenon; declines in public payments expand the shortfalls that surcharge rates were set to meet. 4 Cost-shifting may thus be a more prominent phenomenon when regulatory regimes of this sort are in effect than when they are not. 5 Finally, our analysis suggests that regulatory arbitrage may join more 4 Standard bargaining considerations push in the opposite direction because a weakening of a party's outside option will tend to reduce the payments for which it is able to negotiate (Dranove, 1988; Clemens and Gottlieb, Forthcoming) . 5 This appears loosely consistent with trends in the cost-shifting literature. Cutler (1998) , for conventional market factors, as analyzed by Dranove, Simon, and White (1998) , as a force contributing to the managed care revolution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides more background on all-payer rate setting arrangements. Section 2 develops insights regarding the stability of allpayer regimes and the determinants of the financing pressures they face. Section 3 describes the data we assemble, and sections 4 and 5 present our empirical analysis.
Section 6 discusses the legal challenges faced by all-payer regimes, and section 7 further discusses their economic incidence. Section 8 briefly concludes. Table 1 presents details on the start, end, and other key dates in the history of these states' all-payer regulatory regimes.
example, finds stronger evidence of cost shifting during the 1980s than during the 1990s. In a summary of the literature, Frakt (2014) observes that evidence of cost-shifting weakened over time. 6 While Washington state is often included among lists of mandatory all-payer rate regulation systems, our reading is that its regulatory system was effectively a system of budget review rather than rate regulation (Baker, 1975) . The occasionally referenced regulatory regimes in Colorado and Wisconsin were short-lived, lasting only three years each (Chen and Weir, 2009) . West Virginia continues to operate a long-standing system of rate regulation, however, the rate review system only applies to commercial insurers and allows for variation in payment methods and amounts within specified ranges (Murray and Berenson, 2015) . Similarly, Maine's rate setting system, enacted in 1983, never encompassed Medicare and only partially applied to Medicaid (Kilbreth, 2010) . Consistent with one of our primary points, Maine's use of uncompensated care surcharges was phased out in favor of efforts to push towards eliminating uncompensated care through expansions of insurance coverage (Kilbreth, 2010) . We say little about Maine's experience because it has been documented in far less detail than the experience of other states. A second exception to all-payer rate setting involved the participation of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). As detailed below, the extent of such exemptions varied considerably across states. Given their prominence over the last quarter century, an "all-payer" system that exempts HMOs may sound inherently unworkable and perhaps arbitrary in its application. When such regimes were first initiated, however, HMOs were far less prevalent. On average across states, they accounted for less than 5 percent of coverage through the early 1980s.
Two additional considerations underlay HMOs' exemptions from all-payer rate setting. First, capitated payment models can, by design, involve an effort to shift away from fee-for-service physician payments or diagnosis-based hospital payments.
Differences in the nature of their hospital contracts thus raised complications for enforcing common payment regulations on both HMOs and more traditional insurers.
Second, managed care and all-payer rate setting were sometimes viewed as potentially complementary approaches to controlling health care costs (Bovbjerg, Cuellar, and Holahan, 2000) . Some policy makers thus viewed exemption from all-payer rate setting as a mechanism for promoting experimentation with managed care.
Early research on all-payer rate setting regimes focused on whether they achieved their stated cost containment goals. The evidence on this point varies across states, as should be expected given substantive differences in their implementation. The weight of the evidence suggests that rate setting successfully limited health spending per hospital admission (Atkinson, 2009; Murray, 2009) . It is less certain, however, whether this translated into reductions in broader spending metrics, including overall hospital spending and total personal health spending per capita (McDonough, 1995; Pauly and Town, 2012) . Pauly and Town (2012) further discuss rate regulation's implications for the efficiency of payment setting. Variations in market power appear, to at least some extent, to underlie variations in health care payments (Dunn and Shapiro, 2012, 2014; Cooper, Craig, Gaynor, and Van Reenen, 2015) . Additional issues, including intransparency and the pervasiveness of public-private payment linkages, raise further questions about the efficiency of private health care payment setting (Batty and Ippolito, 2017; Brill, 2013; Clemens, Gottlieb, and Molnar, 2015) . At the same time, mandated price consistency erodes incentives for providing services with high quality on dimensions that are difficult for regulators to measure, or in which they take no interest (Pauly and Town, 2012) . As with any centralized price system, such regimes may struggle with either awareness of, or responsiveness to, determinants of supply and demand at the local level.
Our analysis focuses on the use of all-payer regulations as a mechanism for financing uncompensated care. By funding uncompensated care costs via transfers from the insured, this system introduced a potential instability. Specifically, this funding mechanism can be undone if individuals forego coverage, which would feed back into surcharge rates by increasing the overall uncompensated care financing burden.
While the limited availability of premium data has made it difficult for research to examine the pass through of input costs directly, changes in health care costs have been regularly linked to declines in insurance coverage rates (Glied and Jack, 2003; Kronick and Gilmer, 1999) . Despite the instability these systems risked, the view that uncompensated care "should" be financed within the hospital system was common among the designers and implementers of the relevant regulations.
Understanding Uncompensated Care Financing
This section lays out our framework for analyzing the allocation of costs associated with uncompensated care. We begin with an accounting description of the uncompensated care financing budget constraint. Our goal in presenting this budget constraint in detail is to highlight the connection between uncompensated care surcharge rates and other policy instruments designed to subsidize care consumption by the uninsured and/or by low income households. We then introduce the relevant economic linkages across components of the framework. Our primary goal in presenting these linkages is to describe the stability of the uncompensated care financing mechanism when faced with shocks to uncompensated care financing needs.
Accounting for Uncompensated Care
From a purely accounting perspective, we begin by describing the aggregate of uncompensated care costs. Such costs are the product of the number of uninsured individuals, N u , the number of visits each individual makes to the hospital each year, Q u , and the resource cost of each visit, P u . These costs can be financed through a variety of sources. Hospitals can receive subsidies from the federal government, F , and from state and local governments, S. They may use cross-subsidies generated through the rates charged to private insurers, C. Finally, they may incur a deficit D.
The budget constraint associated with uncompensated care financing is thus:
(1)
The Economics of Uncompensated Care Financing
We now introduce relevant relationships between the components of the budget constraint in equation (1). The cross-subsides engineered through rate regulation involve surcharges on the rates charged to private payers. Let N be the total population and let the number of privately insured individuals be N p = N − N u . Let the number of visits by each private patient be Q p , the base payment per visit be P p , and the uncompensated care surcharge be τ . This gives us C = N p Q p P p τ .
We next consider the relationship between the surcharge and demand for private insurance. Surcharges increase the net price insurers must pay for their beneficiaries'
care. For analytic simplicity, we assume that these charges are fully passed through to consumers in the form of higher premiums. 7 Demand for insurance, as described by the number of privately insured individuals, is thus decreasing in these surcharges.
A further point of interest is that demand for private insurance depends on the accessibility of care, as represented by Q u P u , provided to the uninsured. 8 This gives us
Finally, we consider determinants of the total cost of uncompensated care. Q u and P u can be viewed as the extensive and intensive margins of the generosity of uncompensated care provision. The amount of uncompensated care per uninsured individual depends on two factors of interest. The first is the net revenue associated with each visit. 9 Letting R u be the available per-visit reimbursement, the net revenue from each uninsured visit is R u −P u . A conceptually distinct source of variation in the uncompensated care claimed involves the management practices of uncompensated care pool administrators. The relevant activity of these administrators can be described as a combination of utilization review and fraud detection, or more generally as "moral hazard management." Let these management practices be described by the vector E. Taken together, we can then write Q u = Q u (R u − P u , E). The intensive margin could be similarly analyzed. That is, the resource cost of each uncompensated care visit could similarly be described as a function of fee-for-service reimbursement generosity and utilization management strategies. For simplicity we treat P u as fixed.
With the above relationships in mind, the budget constraint associated with uncompensated care provision becomes:
Let τ * be the surcharge such that the budget constraint from equation (2) is balanced with an incurred deficit of D = 0. The budget balancing surcharge τ * is
and revenue of N p (τ * + 1, Q u P u )Q p P p τ * is collected.
Financing Uncompensated Care through All-Payer Rate

Surcharges
We now step further into the economics of financing uncompensated care through surcharges on private insurers' payment rates. In this section we characterize the ease with which such systems can generate incremental revenue. Such considerations would be particularly salient when a state first implements this financing mechanism or when its financing needs increase. 10
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to 1 + τ produces expressions that can be usefully compared with expressions that describe the incremental revenue generated by increases in tax rates (Feldstein, 1999; Saez, 2001) . Net of new expenditure, the change in revenue generated by an increase in the surcharge rate is
The terms in equation (4) have intuitive interpretations. The first term describes the revenue mechanically generated by an increase in the surcharge rate. The second term describes the revenue lost by the decline in insurance coverage that results from increasing the surcharge rate. The third term describes the increase in uncompensated care costs resulting from the decline in insurance coverage due to the rising surcharge rate.
How does equation (4) compare with canonical expressions from the public finance literature? A superficial difference is that the surcharges we analyze are equivalent to sales taxes, while canonical papers in the public finance literature discuss incremental increases in income tax rates. It is thus helpful to keep in mind that the incentive effects of an income tax of 100 percent would be comparable to an infinite sales tax rather than a sales tax of 100 percent.
Beyond this superficial difference, there is a key conceptual distinction between the current setting and standard tax-collection settings. In standard income tax analyses, the government's revenue needs are taken as fixed, or as being determined through a separate problem. In such settings, behavioral responses to taxation enter solely through their effect on the size of the effective tax base. Here, by contrast, behavioral responses to surcharges affect both the base on which surcharges are collected and the amount of revenue the surcharge must generate. When individuals drop insurance coverage, any uncompensated care they consume increases surcharge financing needs.
A straightforward assumption greatly eases comparisons of the current setting with canonical settings. Assume that the quantity of care consumed by each insured and uninsured individual is the same, so that Q p P p = Q u P u . 11 With that assumption in place, we now substitute the elasticity of the private coverage rate with respect to the tax-inclusive price, namely Np,1+τ = dNp(1+τ )
Np , into equation (4). This yields the expression below:
The second and third terms from the top line of equation (5) describe the contraction of the surcharge base and the expansion of financing needs that result from a surcharge increase's effects on insurance purchases. These terms combine to produce the expression in the second line. The net revenue gain from an increase in the surcharge rate is equal to the "mechanical" or "static" revenue gain times 1 plus the elasticity of insurance coverage with respect to the surcharge-inclusive price.
So long as the insurance coverage elasticity is less than one, net surcharge revenue rises as the surcharge rate increases. Because extensive margin estimates of insurance demand elasticities are typically modest (Liu, Chollet, et al., 2006) , this will tend to be the case. At the same time, the feedback from coverage changes to financing needs implies that reaching a given net revenue target will require a higher rate in this setting than it would in the standard sales tax setting.
Incorporating Exclusions from the Effective Tax Base
We now consider all-payer regulatory regimes' treatment of HMOs. All-payer regimes struggled to regulate payments from HMOs, which were exempted from surcharges to varying degrees. In the limiting case of Massachusetts, HMOs were fully exempted.
Let N b describe the total number of traditional insurance beneficiaries and N hmo describe the number of HMO beneficiaries. Having distinguished between plan types, we note further that demand for traditional insurance is a function of both its own surcharge-inclusive price and the price of HMO coverage. We write the budget constraint with a differential tax on HMOs as:
The change in net revenue resulting from an increase in the surcharge rate is now
The difficulty of increasing net revenue in this setting reflects two new considerations.
First, the mechanical revenue gain from either introducing the surcharge or increasing the surcharge is reduced by the fact that the surcharge is collected on a smaller base.
Second, a new behavioral response must be taken into account, namely surchargeinduced transitions from traditional insurance into HMO coverage.
Transitions across forms of insurance should be expected to have quantitatively relevant implications. Traditional insurance and coverage through HMOs are close substitutes. The elasticity of demand for one type of coverage with respect to taxation of another should thus be expected to be much larger than the extensive margin elasticity of demand for all forms of coverage combined. While estimating cross-price elasticities can be empirically challenging, existing studies are consistent with this economic intuition (Liu, Chollet, et al., 2006) .
Data Sources
Our framework shows that a comprehensive understanding of uncompensated care financing requires data on several key features of the environment. These include insurance coverage rates, the intensity of uncompensated care provision, data on hospital spending through Medicare and Medicaid, data on other forms of state and local government support for hospital budgets, data on HMO market shares, and surcharge rates. This section outlines the sources we use to assemble these data. 
Data on Insurance Coverage Rates
Data on Uncompensated Care Provision
Data on total uncompensated care costs are not trivial to come by, due in part to the miscellany of mechanisms used to finance such expenditures. We take estimates of uncompensated care costs as a percent of total hospital revenue from Table 1 of Atkinson, Helms, and Needleman (1997) In this section we begin by documenting the evolution of uncompensated care surcharges across the rate setting regimes we study. Figure 1 presents surcharge rates for the select states and years for which the data are available. It is apparent that surcharges varied significantly both across states and over time. Our goal in this section is to use the data described in the previous section to understand these vari- The states we analyze had comparable, and generally quite low, rates of uninsurance. Variations in uncompensated care costs as a fraction of total hospital charges (which is the metric reported by Atkinson, Helms, and Needleman (1997) In 1985, uncompensated care surcharge rates in Massachusetts were only moderately higher than in New York, yet between 1985 and 1988 they doubled from 7 percent to nearly 14 percent. We connect this to two features of the approach to uncompensated care financing adopted by Massachusetts. The first is that, unlike New York, Massachusetts generated far less hospital financing through its Medicaid program and other state and local government expenditures. The second is that it exempted HMOs from the state rate setting system throughout the period under analysis. Massachusetts thus spread its uncompensated care surcharges across a smaller base than other states. This mattered little in 1980, when the market share of Massachusetts HMOs was 2.9 percent. By 1985, however, that share had expanded to 13.7 percent. By 1990 it had expanded to 26.5 percent. As HMO market share grew, surcharge rates rose. In 1988, the state explicitly capped the revenue generated by uncompensated care surcharges at $300 million. This nominal cap began an effective phasing out of the all-payer financing mechanism (McDonough, 1995) .
Surcharge rates in Connecticut reflected yet another distinctive problem of policy management (again, as represented by the vector E in our conceptual framework).
When Connecticut moved to a uniform surcharge system in 1991, it deviated from other states in the sources of budgetary shortfall it included in its computation of uncompensated care surcharges. Specifically, it included estimated short-falls due to "underpayments" from both Medicare and Medicaid. The burden imposed on Connecticut's base of private sector payments was thus unusually high. The surcharge rate implied by the formula Connecticut initially applied was a substantial 31 percent.
This triggered a combination of lawsuits and legislative revisions that significantly reduced the combination of surcharges and hospital-specific sales taxes applied in subsequent years. Even after these revisions, however, the surcharges in Connecticut rivaled those from the New Jersey all-payer regime's final years.
Erosion of Surcharge Bases and the Abandonment of All-Payer Regimes
In this section we analyze insurance coverage changes over the years preceding the abandonment of states' all-payer rate regulation regimes. We first present data on changes in private insurance coverage rates and in the fraction of individuals without insurance. We emphasize that, regardless of their underlying causes, these coverage changes implied contractions of all-payer regimes' financing bases and expansions of their financing needs. Building on this analysis, we use a shock to New Jersey's rate setting system to provide causal evidence on the channels through which un-compensated care costs eroded the private insurance market. Next, we present data on expansions in HMO coverage in states that exempted HMOs from their all-payer surcharges. Using the experience of one state -Massachusetts -we present evidence on the causal pathways linking uncompensated care financing to the rise of HMOs and collapse of all-payer rate setting.
The Evolution of Insurance Coverage Preceding the Abandonment of All-Payer Regimes
This section presents data on changes in insurance coverage rates over the years preceding the abandonment of states' all-payer rate regulation regimes. In figure 5 we present data describing coverage changes over the years preceding four distinct events, namely the abandonment of the all-payer regimes in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. We use CPS data on individuals under age 65 to estimate insurance coverage rates in each year in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
We then construct event studies comparing coverage in the relevant all-payer state to coverage in all other states. The event studies extend from the year four years preceding the abandonment of the all-payer system to the year of that event itself.
The data presented in figure 5 are averages of these series across the four events we analyze. We present these trends relative to baseline coverage rates four years prior to abandonment.
All-payer regimes were abandoned following periods during which private insurance coverage rates declined. Across the four episodes we analyze, private coverage in the states that abandoned their all-payer regimes declined by an average of 3.5 percentage points. This is nearly a 5 percent reduction on a baseline coverage rate of 78 percent. Some individuals transitioned into public insurance, while others became uninsured. The rise in the fraction uninsured averaged 1.5 percentage points, which was an increase of 11 percent on a base of 13.5 percent.
We do not interpret these coverage changes as being causally linked to either the existence of states' all-payer regimes or some other policy change. We observe instead that, regardless of their underlying causes, these developments increased the strain of uncompensated care costs on states' all-payer regimes. On average across the four states' experiences, surcharge rates would have had to rise by roughly 16 percent (5 percent from the decline in private coverage and 11 percent from the increase in the fraction uninsured) over the 4 years preceding their abandonment.
Causal Pathways in the Case of New Jersey
In this section we analyze a key shock to the New Jersey system: the expiration of its Medicare waiver. From its inception in 1978, New Jersey's all-payer system included a formal regulatory mechanism to fund the provision of uncompensated care. Initially, each hospital was allowed to charge a mark-up (on top of the state-approved rates) that was proportional to the amount of uncompensated care it delivered. Because hospitals delivered varying amounts of uncompensated care, the mark-ups charged by hospitals began to differ markedly. By 1985, mark-ups ranged from 1 to 20 percent across hospitals, placing hospitals that provided more uncompensated care at a competitive disadvantage (Volpp and Siegel, 1993) . hence a similar amount of UCTF contributions (Volpp and Siegel, 1993) . We more formally estimate the effect of Medicare's withdrawal on the evolution of coverage in New Jersey using the event study specification below, in which i indexes individuals, t indexes years, and s indexes states:
where K = {−3, −2, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. (1995) , we capture expansions in generosity through changes in two measures of eligibility between 1988 and 1991: the age limit for children and income limit for infant coverage. 15 We calculate the change in each measure between 1988 and 1991 and interact each with year indicator variables to allow the effects of coverage expansions to unfold dynamically over time.
The primary coefficients of interest are the set of δ k . These are the coefficients on the variables described by New Jersey s(i),1989+k , which are indicators for whether an observation is from New Jersey in a year that is k years relative to 1989. The coefficients of interest thus describe differential coverage changes in New Jersey relative to other states.
We estimate equation (8) using data from the March Supplements of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1986-1993. 16 The coverage changes are from a given
year relative to the omitted year, k = −1, which denotes the year just before the expiration of New Jersey's Medicare waiver. We also report results from a trend-break specification which summarizes the change in coverage trends in a single coefficient.
That is, we estimate:
where T is equal to the number of years subsequent to 1988. Because this analysis involves a setting in which a single state was affected by the policy change of interest, cluster robust standard errors are likely to be insufficiently conservative (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008) . We thus implement an approach to inference commonly called the permutation test (Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2012) . This test involves assigning "placebo" treatment status, one at a time, to each of the 50 states. For each placebo treatment state, we then estimate (9). This generates a distribution of placebo treatment effects. Inference is conducted by examining the position of the true estimates within the distribution of placebo estimates. The fraction of placebo estimates that are larger than the true estimate can be inter-preted as the p-value on a one-sided significance test. Figure 8 plots These declines in private coverage and increases in the fraction uninsured suggest that, had New Jersey not abandoned its all-payer regime, surcharges would have risen further still. The coverage changes we estimate suggest that the waiver's expiration resulted in a 7 percent contraction of the financing base and a 50 percent increase in financing needs associated with the uninsured. Absent other policy changes, surcharge rates would thus have had to rise by an additional 9 percentage points (a 57 percent increase on the 1991 base of 18 percent) to fund uncompensated care.
While New Jersey's insurance market had significantly deteriorated, we note that it was unlikely to enter a "death spiral." As emphasized in section 2, extensive margin elasticities of demand for insurance coverage tend to be insufficiently large to generate the extreme version of this outcome. At the same time, these developments imply that the increasingly burdensome incidence of uncompensated care financing was borne by a narrowing base of private insurance purchasers. We speculate that this would have contributed to the strength of subsequent legal challenges to the surcharge financing mechanism.
HMO Market Shares
Preceding the Abandonment of All-
Payer Regimes
As discussed above, states struggled with the question of how best to incorporate HMOs into their all-payer regulatory regimes. Massachusetts went to the extreme of fully exempting HMOs from its all-payer surcharges. In New York, the transition from the NYPHRM II to the NYPHRM III versions of the all-payer regime significantly increased HMOs' ability to negotiate discounted rates. This reform occurred in 1988 (McDonough, 1995) . In this section, we present data on the evolution of HMO coverage in Massachusetts and New York relative to other states.
Panel A of Figure 9 presents data on the evolution of HMO market shares in 
Causal Pathways in the Case of Massachusetts
The 1980s expansion of Massachusetts HMOs significantly eroded the base on which its uncompensated care surcharges were collected. From 1980 to 1990, the expansion of HMO market share implied a 25 percent contraction of the base on which sur-charges were being collected. Relative to its 1985 surcharge rate of 10 percent, this mechanically implies a 3.3 percentage point increase in the surcharge rate.
In this section we consider how the Massachusetts insurance market might have evolved had it not capped surcharge revenue at $300 million in 1988 and abandoned its all-payer regime in 1991. Inferring the insurance market's counterfactual evolution requires inferring the causal effect of all-payer surcharges on the HMO market share.
This is a non-trivial task because the expansion of Massachusetts HMOs resulted from many factors. In addition to the arbitrage opportunity associated with uncompensated care surcharges, these include the market conditions underlying the HMO revolution more generally (Dranove, Simon, and White, 1998 During the 1990s, the base on which surcharges were collected would thus have contracted considerably. From 1990 to 2000, the market share of traditional insurers contracted by 1/3 (from 74 percent to 47 percent). The required surcharge rate would thus have risen by roughly 50 percent, from 13 percent to nearly 20 percent. The elasticity estimated above suggests that this increase would have led to an additional 7 percent decline in traditional insurers' market share. In this setting, it appears quite plausible that the market for traditional insurance coverage would have unraveled completely. Absent a complete unraveling, the incidence of uncompensated care financing would have begun to fall on a very narrow base.
Legal Challenges to All-Payer Surcharges
Eroding surcharge bases and accompanying increases in surcharge rates contributed to a series of lawsuits levied against several states' all-payer rate setting regimes. The lawsuits involved self-insured, large-employer plans alleging that all-payer surcharges violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The legal reasoning behind these claims centered on the fact that ERISA gives federal regulation primacy in the governance of self-insured, large-employer plans. ERISA has historically been interpreted as exempting self-insured firms from state regulations that "relate to" an employee benefit plan. 17 Firms in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut argued with some success that surcharges on their insurance plans' payments to hospitals "relate to" the benefits they seek to provide their employees. pital, 793 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.J. 1992) ; New England Health Care Employee Union District 1199 v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 846 F. Supp. 190 (D.Conn. 1994); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993 S. 645 (1995) . Upon appeal, a similar decision regarding New Jersey's rate setting system was found in United Wire, Metal and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 995 F.2d 1179, (3d Cir. 1993) to finance hospitals' uncompensated care costs. We identify three salient features of these surcharges' economic incidence.
A first point of interest is the economic instability of the all-payer surcharge mechanism. As shown in section 2, uncompensated care surcharges are a less stable financing mechanism than broad-based income taxation. Standard tax analysis observes that an increase in a tax rate typically leads to a contraction of the tax base. As a result, the rate increase raises less revenue than a "static" or "mechanical" calculation would imply. The current setting contains an amplified feedback mechanism. This is because contractions of the surcharge base involve simultaneous expansions of uncompensated care financing needs. A second source of instability stemmed from all-payer regimes' treatment of HMOs. As shown in our analysis of Massachusetts, contractions in the effective tax base could be particularly large when HMOs were exempted. The exclusion of a close substitute from the implicit tax base significantly increases the elasticity of the implicit tax base with respect to the surcharge-inclusive price. As a result, the surcharge mechanism in Massachusetts risked a full unwinding and, by extension, a failure to raise significant revenue. The Massachusetts all-payer regime's unraveling has a close parallel with a second class of cross-subsidy regulations in the health insurance context. By preventing insurers from adjusting premiums to account for a beneficiary's health status, community rating regulations engineer transfers from the healthy to those with pre-existing conditions (Clemens, 2015; Handel, Hendel, and Whinston, 2015) . These regulations risk unraveling through adverse selection. If premiums rise above healthy individuals' willingness to pay, the healthy may exit the market. As coverage among the healthy declines, premium will rise. When a complete "death spiral" unfolds (Cutler and Reber, 1998) , the envisioned transfers to those with pre-existing conditions may altogether fail to materialize. Like all-payer surcharges, these regulations thus risk failing to achieve their distributional goals while simultaneously reducing the welfare of those they implicitly attempt to tax.
A second point involves the political economy of all-payer surcharges' incidence.
The incidence of all-payer surcharges was targeted at private insurers and their beneficiaries. From a political economy perspective, it is relevant that insurers and the managers of employer-provided health plans are well organized groups. Exemptions from all-payer surcharges (e.g., for HMOs or for states' Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans) exacerbated this problem. The existence of exemptions both narrowed the revenue base and introduced the prospect of lobbying for further exceptions. In practice, surcharges became sufficiently large (and arbitrarily applied) to prompt legal action.
As discussed in section 6, self-insured plans in three states filed claims of federal pre-emption under ERISA. Although eventually overturned, each suit was initially successful in federal court.
A third point involves the welfare implications of all-payer surcharges' incidence.
The incidence of surcharges added to hospital payments falls on some combination of hospital patients with private insurance coverage, individuals who drop coverage due to increases in their premiums, and the owners and employees of hospitals and insurance companies. The welfare properties of uncompensated care surcharges are thus quite murky. From a social welfare perspective, it is worth asking whether hospital care for the uninsured would be better financed through taxation, which can be targeted as desired across the income distribution and will result in less disruption to the markets for health care and health insurance.
Analogies involving the incidence of tax-financed transfers and regulatory crosssubsidies can be made in many settings. Examples include redistribution through the minimum wage, interest rate ceilings (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998) , rent control (Arnott, 1995) , universally priced postage and the pricing of public utilities (Posner, 1971 ). In the familiar minimum wage context, for example, the incidence of resulting transfers is borne by some combination of low-skilled workers' employers, consumers of the goods and services they produce, and low-skilled individuals who lose employment. Analogies to the set of firms, consumers, and targeted individuals who bear the incidence of all-payer surcharges are thus fairly strong.
Conclusion
Our analysis of hospital rate regulation illustrates issues that can arise when a policy instrument's purview is over-extended. Policy makers primarily understood all-payer rate setting regimes to be a mechanism for controlling costs. We provide evidence that both the economic and legal stability of these regulations were undermined by their extension to ancillary goals. Specifically, the stability of hospital rate regulation was undermined by its use as a mechanism for financing uncompensated care.
Uncompensated care surcharges were beset by several problems. We show that the surcharge mechanism risks an unraveling phenomenon that is comparable in some respects to the adverse selection problem. Further, the administration of these surcharges was cumbersome and their economic incidence was complex. Had these surcharges remained intact, their incidence would increasingly have been borne by relatively narrow sets of privately insured individuals.
The history of all-payer rate setting can be understood through the lens of the Tinbergen Rule (Tinbergen, 1952) , which recommends that independent objectives be met with independently dedicated policy instruments. Cost control and uncompensated care financing are, in the relevant sense, independent policy objectives. Because they were abandoned, all-payer rate setting regimes ultimately achieved neither. surcharge rates for states' uncompensated care pools in various years. New Jersey: Data are take from Gaskin (1997) . Connecticut: Data are from Kasprak (1999) (1987); data for 1987: Holahan et al. (1997) ; data for 1990: Auditor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1999) . New York: Data are from Bovbjerg, Cuellar, and Holahan (2000) . [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . The sample excludes all respondents over the age of 65. Each circle in both panels represents an estimate of δ from equation 9. The 51 circles in each panel correspond with separate estimates for which "treatment status" has been assigned to a different state. The true point estimate associated with the regression in which treatment status is assigned to New Jersey is filled in with darker coloring than the other 50 estimates. Panel A presents estimates for the private coverage rate while panel B presents estimates for the fraction uninsured. The area of each state's marker is scaled in accordance with the "treatment" state's population in 1990. 
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